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Introduction
T he notion of a comprehensive approach is not new. Its antecedents can be found in the writings of Clausewitz, who examined conflict in more than exclusively military terms. However, conflict in his age was focused mainly on 
the clash of military forces among sovereign nations. Although classic state-on-state 
warfare is not extinct, most conflicts today are far more complex, requiring various 
approaches and solutions. At the same time, the international geopolitical environ-
ment is rapidly evolving. Emerging factors include both globalization and competi-
tion for resources and an unstable international security environment including 
nonstate actors. To prepare to deal with such matters, this manual examines emerg-
ing characterizations of the comprehensive approach and its application to peacekeep-
ing, the maritime domain, cyberspace, and energy security.
Many nations recognize that the military instrument alone cannot deal with 
complex crises involving diverse communities and that existing strategies, organiza-
tions, and force structures might not be suited to future contingencies. Accordingly, 
national and intergovernmental organizations have sought responses to increas-
ingly complex challenges. Among them is the notion of a comprehensive approach, 
however loosely defined or accepted. Nonetheless, the principles of 
a comprehensive approach have been applied in some operations, 
and it remains indispensable to the conduct of ongoing and future 
operations including civil-military missions.
The principles of a comprehensive approach can be extend-
ed to multidimensional security missions involving maritime, 
cyber, and energy security. They expand traditional peacekeeping 
and humanitarian operational models that are prime applica-
tions of comprehensive approaches. Increasingly complex security 
issues demand intelligent, discreet application of comprehensive 
approach principles to international crises that are studied in this 
manual through a series of four cases: synchronizing peacekeeping operations, 
preserving access to oceans of the global commons, deterring acts of aggression in 
cyberspace, and protecting supplies of energy resources. 
Some cases such as peacekeeping and maritime security have developed 
relatively mature models for the practical application of a comprehensive approach. 
Cybersecurity enjoys a general consensus regarding the need for coordinated efforts 
across the various sectors and organizations involved in and dependent upon 
maintenance of a safe and reliable cyberspace. Energy security, though certainly 
recognized as a collective challenge, has thus far proven too complex and politically 
sensitive to tackle in a coordinated fashion. Since 2006, NATO has championed a 
coordinated international effort to reduce risk and promote energy infrastructure 
security. However, its member states are sharply divided over the need, and indeed 
Comprehensive Approach
Although no universally accepted definition of 
the comprehensive approach exists, the concept is 
fundamentally grounded in a congruence of effort, 
not in unity of command. A working definition of 
the approach is the manifestation of the idea of 
mobilizing the resources of an entire society to 
succeed in complex operations.
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the appropriateness, of a collective approach to energy security. Established Alliance 
members in particular argue that energy infrastructure protection should be national 
responsibilities, while others are concerned that NATO involvement in energy secu-
rity would unnecessarily heighten regional tensions and disrupt diplomatically or 
economically driven solutions.
While functional models have been used to a certain extent, a generally 
accepted concept of the comprehensive approach simply does not exist. Even 
though definitions remain elusive, it is possible to describe the approach and its 
core principles. Similarly, no agreement exists on the objectives of a comprehensive 
approach. But any discussion requires taxonomy or an attempt at classification, 
which this manual identifies as the coherent multidimensional response, or the princi-
pal goal of this approach. In the absence of a clear definition, mobilizing the resources 
of an entire society captures the meaning of a comprehensive approach. This descrip-
tion builds on the idea of whole-of-government that includes intergovernmental 
bodies, nongovernmental agencies, academic institutions, and the private sector as 
well as national resources.
The first chapter of this manual, “Principles and Mechanisms” by George T. 
Hodermarsky, utilizes a working definition of the comprehensive approach to clarify its 
universal tenets and tangible benefits, as well as the issues and risks associated with 
its application. It is followed by a chapter on “Multidimensional Peacekeeping” in 
which Scott Moreland examines comprehensive approaches to peacekeeping that 
enhance coordination. Next, Jeffrey E. Kline and Lyla Englehorn focus on coordi-
nation models to counter a range of threats to the maritime domain in a chapter 
entitled “International Maritime Security.” The fourth chapter on “Deterrence of 
Cyber Aggression” by Scott Jasper looks at a vital domain of the global commons 
beset by theft of data, denial of service, and other malicious actions. The fifth and 
final chapter, “Challenges to Energy Security” by Daniel A. Nussbaum considers the 
security of resources, which is defined in terms of availability, accessibility, afford-
ability, and acceptability.
Finally, a few disclaimers are required at the outset. It is not possible to cover 
every aspect of a comprehensive approach. This manual considers ideas while mak-
ing no attempt to expound a concept of operations or propose doctrinal tenets. It 
presents a high-level examination to allow for the application of the comprehensive 






by George T. Hodermarsky
A lthough no universally accepted definition of a comprehensive approach exists, it is possible to explain the concept. Recognizing the lack of a com-monly accepted definition, the chapter uses mobilizing the resources of an 
entire society as the basis of a working definition. It expands on the notion of a 
whole-of-government approach by including intergovernmental organizations, non-
governmental organizations, academe, and the private sector.
Despite the fact that a comprehensive approach cannot be precisely defined, 
the principles and mechanisms it employs are widely accepted and applied. Addi-
tionally, the lessons learned in contemporary stability and peace operations dem-
onstrate the benefits of a comprehensive approach as well as the challenges to 
its implementation. Based on experiences in operations in the 
Western Balkans and Afghanistan, NATO issued a Comprehensive 
Approach Action Plan in March 2012.  The tasks associated with 
this plan are implemented by a combined civil-military task force 
that includes all relevant NATO entities and commands.
NATO is not alone in its efforts to employ a comprehen-
sive approach to operations. Other informative examples include 
support for the Dayton peace accords on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in 1995, the United Nations (UN)-mandated North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) campaign in Kosovo beginning in 1999, the peacekeeping intervention in 
Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2000, and the multinational European Union (EU)-led 
counterpiracy efforts conducted off Somalia.
There are multiple interpretations of a comprehensive approach. Its charac-
terization by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands captures its essence 
and clearly indicates civilian leadership. Moreover, Sweden has been at the forefront 
of thinking about a comprehensive approach. Indeed, the Viking Exercises have 
been centered on the idea of cooperation among governmental (civilian, military, 
Objective
To introduce benefits, issues, considerations, risks, 
costs, and resource requirements for coordinating 
uniformed troops, civilian agencies, and private 
sector organizations that share operational space 
in a zone of conflict or crisis.
Comprehensive Approach Action Plan
NATO support within the international community to a comprehensive approach to crisis management and stabilization operations.  
This includes political, civilian and military involvement in the planning and conduct of operations.  NATO will strengthen cooperation 
with partner countries, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and local authorities.  NATO recognizes the 
European Union and United Nations as key institutional partners.
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and police), intergovernmental, and nongovernmental 
organizations. Additionally, the doctrine emerging in the 
United Kingdom contains a particularly helpful definition of 
a comprehensive approach. Finally, the US National Secu-
rity Strategy recommends utilizing the approach while not 
defining or expanding the concept.
The 2010 version of the NATO Strategic Concept 
encourages the use of a comprehensive approach. Notice-
ably, it describes the NATO contribution to a comprehensive 
approach while recognizing that the Alliance does not pos-
sess the necessary civilian capabilities to employ the concept 
alone. Allied joint doctrine endorses the commitment to 
this approach by developing it beyond the strategic level. 
By using the term international partners, NATO acknowledges the wide participation 
required for completion of a broad set of missions.
In June 2013 a total of 114 nations were supplying more than 90,000 sol-
diers, policemen, and military observers to the United Nations in support of 15 
peacekeeping missions. Although the world body does not use the term comprehen-
sive approach, the Secretary General stated that an integrated strategic framework 
is “the guiding principle for all conflict and postconflict situations where the UN 
has a country team and a multidimensional peacekeeping 
operation, whether or not these presences are structurally 
integrated.”
UN Civil-Military Coordination is the system of inter-
action that involves the exchange of information, negotia-
tion, deconfliction, mutual support, and planning undertaken 
at every level among military elements
 
and humanitarian 
organizations, development organizations, and local civilian 
populations to achieve their respective mission objectives.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) endeavors to prevent conflicts from arising 
and facilitate lasting comprehensive settlements in conflict 
National Perspectives
•   Netherlands—as civilian as possible, as military as 
necessary
•   Sweden—integration of military and civilian activities 
including nongovernmental organizations
•   United Kingdom—develop principles and collaborative 
processes to enhance likelihood of favorable and 
enduring outcomes in particular situations




to crisis management as part of the international 
community and improve the capability to deliver 









tions conducted by the United Nations 
establish an integrated strategic frame-
work with a shared vision of strategic 
objectives and set of agreed upon results, 
timelines, and responsibilities
Organization for Security 
and Cooperation
Since its founding, the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe has 
pursued a comprehensive approach to 
security and remains the only international 
forum to place human, economic, environ-
mental, and political-military dimensions of 
security on an equal footing.
Figure 1.1 UN and OSCE Contributions
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situations. It also enhances the likelihood of success in the postconflict task of 
rehabilitation. OSCE police operations are essential to both preventing conflicts and 
restoring stability following them. The OSCE role, however, is limited by insufficient 
resources to act globally, and its legitimacy has been questioned by a number of par-
ticipating nations even in its own region.
The United Nations has identified three broad levels of interaction between 
civilian and military organizations: cooperation, coordination, and coexistence. 
Cooperation is more readily achieved in peacetime. However, in conflict situations, 
the divide between civilian and military activities reduces coordination to the level 
of coexistence and deconfliction.
Unifying Principles
While the term comprehensive approach is ill defined, it is essential to exam-
ine its principles. For this discussion the concept is identified as the employment of 
unified principles in planning and conducting integrated operations focused on cooperation 
and coordination with all relevant actors in an increasingly complex environment. The 
purposes of a comprehensive approach are developing cooperation among partners 
where feasible and integrating their various 
capabilities where possible. Its major tasks are 
developing both a shared vision of strategic 
objectives and an endstate, requiring mutual 
awareness of threats, risks, and actions of 
participants.
Employment of a comprehensive 
approach to operations will be challenging, 
thus its costs, risks, and level of effort must 
be justified by its benefits. For example, the 
theory of comparative advantage developed 
by the classic economist David Ricardo has 
relevance. In its simplest form, it argues that 
nations should concentrate on industries in 
which they are most competitive and trade with others to obtain those products 
they do not produce nationally. Extrapolating the theory to crisis management, 
organizations that are better at assisting refugees or providing humanitarian relief, 
such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Medicens sans Frontiers, 
United Nations Guidelines
Civil-military coordination is a shared responsibility of the humanitarian and military actors, and it may take place 
in various levels of intensity and form. Where cooperation between the humanitarian and military actors is not 
appropriate, opportune, or possible, or if there are no common goals to pursue, then these actors merely operate 
side-by-side. 
. . . [The] UN CMCoord basic strategy ranges from coexistence to cooperation. In either side of the spectrum 
and in between, coordination—for example, the essential dialogue and interaction—is necessary in order to 
protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, and minimize inconsistency. Shared vision may be 
a bit far-reaching, so “mutual interests” might be a more realistic ambition. 
Comprehensive Approach to Operations
 Purposes
•   Increase cooperation with international partners to avoid crises, manage conflicts, 







vulnerabilities, assess risks, analyze collaboration, and manage incidents.






of the combined efforts
Minimizing competition
and deconicting
The essential dialogue and interaciton
necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles,
avoid competition, and minimize inconsistency
should lead those tasks, while the armed forces should focus primarily on providing 
security and strategic lift capabilities. With a comprehensive approach to opera-
tions, participating organizations are tasked to do those things they do best. Obvi-
ously this theory has its limitations similar to models of a free market economy. 
However, applying its principles could yield efficiencies in allocating resources and 
reducing the duplication of effort. These principles are not a panacea for all of the 
problems that arise in a multidimensional operational environment, but even mod-
est gains in providing a framework for interaction and opportunities for efficiencies 
in the employment of various capabilities justify the effort of this approach.
While acknowledging its complexities and challenges, the development of a 
framework to enhance cooperation may lessen distrust and hesitancy among par-
ticipants, boosting the number of organizations willing to accept responsibilities in 
cooperative missions.
A Common Vision
Before they can be applied, the principles of a comprehensive approach 
to operations have to be identified. First, the shared vision functions on a very 
high level. At times it is clearly stated and, for example, found in a United Nations 
mandate. Such manifestations by a respected worldwide organization greatly aid in 
reaching consensus on strategic objectives. Even with such direction, however, inter-
pretations can vary widely. Second, congruence is defined as a state of agreeing or 
coinciding, of being compatible or conforming. This explanation is helpful because 
it is likely to be more acceptable and preferable to precise terms such as integration 
and interaction. Third, as mentioned earlier, some degree of cooperation and coordi-
nation enhances effectiveness. Fourth, and importantly, the successful application 
of a comprehensive approach to operations requires a deep level of understanding of 
the roles, missions, and capabilities of partners.
Figure 1.2 The Scope of Civil-Military Relationships
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The former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral James 
Stavridis, observed in an article published in PRISM (March 2011) that 
while the potential of a comprehensive approach remains “limited only 
by the desire to assist, in actuality it is difficult to mobilize, organize, 
and coordinate the activities of all these disparate actors. Even agreeing 
to a common purpose can be difficult to achieve, much less agreeing on 
where and how to do things.”
Issues and Considerations
While an important element in effective comprehensive 
approaches to operations, working with nongovernmental organiza-
tions is challenging because of their large number and the variance in 
their contributions. An estimated 1,300 different organizations operated at times in 
Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, each organization has its specific mandate and objec-
tives. Similarly, every military or civilian organization and private or governmental 
agency has its own culture and operating procedures, which may cause friction. 
Some organizations desire a maximum degree of cooperation and interaction while 
many also prefer or even insist on operating independently. Understandably, these 
factors often preclude establishment of common procedures.
Globalization with its associated benefits and adverse effects, combined with 
technological advancements, have created an operational environment with further 
complexities and issues that have not been previously encountered. For diverse rea-
sons organizations are reluctant to accede to long-term agreements. Hence coopera-
tion tends to be ad hoc and situation dependent. While this approach may allow for 
more flexible and tailored coordination mechanisms once a mission is established, 
the lack of formal bonds discourages pre-crisis contact among unknown partners 
and forces inefficient in-stride coordination processes in the initial phases. 
Keeping One’s Distance
Although a comprehensive approach to 
operations is dependent on interaction, many 
players, especially nongovernmental organiza-
tions, make their contributions based on neutral-
ity and independence. This need for impartiality, 
especially among humanitarians, may lead to 
friction as these organizations must often inter-
act with legitimate yet corrupt regimes as well as 
factional or insurgent groups to gain access to all 
populations in need.
In addition organizations whose objectives 
are long-term development (primarily civilian) are 
at times at odds with short-term security needs 
(normally military). To varying degrees most nations restrict the level of support 
they provide to nongovernmental organizations. Information sharing is a key 
Principles
A comprehensive approach to operations 
should be based on a common vision of 
strategic objectives, a congruence of effort, 
cooperation and coordination by relevant 
actors within an inclusive stakeholder 
network, and a shared awareness and 













resulting from information sharing
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principle, but it may be challenging to execute. However, it may be possible to share 
the following types of information: 
•   security information—data on civilians and situations in the area of  
operation
•   humanitarian locations—staff and facilities inside a military theater
•   humanitarian activities—routes and timing of convoys and airlifts to 
avoid endangering humanitarian operations or warn of conflicting 
activities
•   mine-action activities—information relevant to mining
•   population movements—major movements of civilians
•   relief activities—efforts undertaken by the military
•   post-strike information.
Financial Oversight
All operations have limited resources with transport and logistics assets par-
ticularly in demand. Any requirement to share these will result in complications and 
possible friction. Effective management of relief and 
reconstruction funding requires mutual understand-
ing and commitment by all involved parties as well 
as the imposition of an infrastructure and resources 
to maintain oversight.
The benefits of pre-crisis interaction and 
training are abundant and obvious. However, event 
sponsorship and funding, and the opportunity costs 
associated with participation continue to limit the 
number and scope of such exercises. Traditionally, 
military organizations support and rely heavily on 
training and exercises. Conversely, nongovernmental 
organizations normally do not have the resources or 
desire to participate in such events even if their value is appreciated. Effective infor-
mation sharing, even if limited by organizational mandates, requires compatible 
equipment and procedures, a situation that has its own inherent costs.
Models for Employment
If mechanisms, structures, and processes are lacking, it follows their develop-
ment could benefit from the use of a model. However, there is an inherent danger in 
adopting a conceptual model because com-
plex problems are ill-suited for one-size-fits-all 
solutions. Nevertheless, civil-military coop-
eration, although primarily employed at the 
tactical level, could provide some insights and 
a possible foundation for a comprehensive 
approach to operations. Both the NATO and 
EU definitions are similar and state the need 









communications equipment and 
procedures
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models have value, a comprehensive approach must consider elements beyond those 
normally associated with the concept.
A paradigm of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is useful in presenting its 
principles, which often represent a synthesis of similar recommendations. Impor-
tantly, the CIMIC concept and a comprehensive approach to operations are not the 
same thing. However, as the relevant NATO doctrine publication states, applying 
CIMIC principles will contribute to a comprehensive approach. They help to govern 
the military direction of CIMIC as well as the civil-military relationship. Moreover, 
the principles guide internal military processes and underpin effective civil-military 







Historically, both governments and organizations have developed structures 
that facilitate communication, cooperation, and coordination, which are manifested 
in numerous forms. Their functions have varied from near-traditional command 
and control to limited information sharing. In terms of nomenclature, distinctions 
among these structures are frequently distorted. There are multiple candidates that 
can serve as models. Significantly, most of these structures are civilian in nature with 
militaries playing critical but nonetheless supporting roles. 
UN–CIMIC is the international military framework for civil-
military coordination for the complete range of operations to include 
conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, 
and peace building. The role of the United Nations Humanitarian Civil-
Military Coordination (UN–CMCoord) is facilitating dialogue and inter-
action between the civilian and military participants, protecting and 
promoting humanitarian principles, avoiding competition, minimizing 
inconsistency, and pursuing common goals when appropriate.
Even though the purpose of civil-military operations and 
humanitarian operations centers are similar, there are significant differ-
ences. The former is established for a combined joint task force and the 
latter by the government of the nation concerned, the United Nations, 
or possibly the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in unilateral US 
operations. Humanitarian operations centers, especially when organized 
under UN auspices, are structured horizontally without any command 
or control authority, where participants are ultimately responsible to 
either their own organization or country. Lastly, the European Union Naval Force 
Somalia, which is conducting Operation Atalanta, is particularly relevant to an 
analysis of maritime security.
Multidimensional Missions
Geopolitical factors such as globalization, competition for resources, and 
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numerous tasks: military, police, rule of law, human rights, reconstitution, public 
information, et al. Like a comprehensive approach, no universally accepted defini-
tion of a multidimensional mission exists. What is clear, however, is that the missions 
examined herein go beyond military operations and need multiple components to 
be effective.
The principles of a comprehensive approach can be extended to multidi-
mensional security operations in support of maritime and cyber missions, which go 
well beyond military activities. Such operations include multiple players drawn from 
national civilian agencies, international and nongovernmental organizations, com-
mercial and social media, and private industry.
. . .
Regardless of organizational structure, comprehensive approaches to 
operations must be guided by best practices developed through prior experience. 
Although this chapter has been focused on organizations, these structures are com-
prised of people, and interpersonal skills based on mutual respect are fundamental 
to effective interaction. Most operations will be at best unorganized, and at times 
chaotic, especially during their early days. The effects of this disorder can be mitigat-
ed through precision in terminology, which is critical to mutual understanding. The 
operational environment will be increasingly complex and will need to be adapted 
to changing conditions. Furthermore, when determining military courses of action, 
the effects on other players must be considered. Many of the risks associated with a 
comprehensive approach could be reduced through pre-crisis training and the estab-
lishment of a common lexicon. The United Nations, NATO, and other organizations 
offer relevant programs that could enhance the effectiveness of operations employ-
ing a comprehensive approach. Finally, undesired effects of military actions must 
be considered as well as perceptions of the independence and neutrality of the roles 






P eacekeeping operations are implemented not only to maintain security but also to restore public order, protect civilians, impose the rule of law, and integrate former warring parties into society. To carry out these missions, the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council issues mandates sanctioning peacekeeping 
operations in response to either crises or conflicts that threaten international stabil-
ity. Peacekeepers may be deployed as blue helmets controlled by the United Nations 
or as part of a coalition or unilateral command authorized by a UN mandate such as 
the African Union forces in Somalia or the NATO International Security Assistance 
Force in Afghanistan. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions are opportunities for 
applying the principles and mechanisms of a comprehensive approach.
In addition to deploying security forces, UN peacekeeping operations are 
legitimate international coordination mechanisms that enable a range of partners 
to make contributions. In practice multidimensional peacekeeping furthers politi-
cal, economic, and humanitarian development efforts by securing operational space 
in both conflict zones and during crises. Security operations are generally coordi-
nated among official bodies but also include ways to facilitate ad 
hoc arrangements among peacekeeping forces and nonaligned 
humanitarian actors, security support to local authorities, and 
authorization to intervene in cases of acute humanitarian crisis at 
the tactical level.
In considering the applicability of multidimensional 
peacekeeping as an exemplar of a comprehensive approach, 
this chapter examines both existing and emerging coordination 
mechanisms among key actors. The examination is based on 
current operations and aimed at enhancing the appreciation of multidimensional 
peacekeeping, identifying best practices, and applying lessons learned. Additionally, 
this chapter utilizes the essential principles and mechanisms of the comprehensive 
approach discussed in the previous chapter.
A Practical Model
The United Nations has not sanctioned the comprehensive approach as doc-
trine, but that is largely a question of semantics. However, the multidimensional 
approach has been defined by a UN resolution as a coherent operational model for 
Objective
To provide an overview of multidimensional 
peacekeeping, explore practical examples of complex 
operations, and identify comprehensive approaches 
to peacekeeping operations that unify diverse aims 
and enhance coordination.
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synonymous concepts that links the comprehensive approach to peacekeeping 
operations. The emphasis placed on coordinated and sustainable solutions relates to 
the goal of a comprehensive approach.
While the United Nations endorses and actively seeks to implement a 
comprehensive approach to multidimensional peacekeeping, it faces many of the 
operational problems that also weakened NATO efforts 
in Afghanistan. Shifting allegiances, fluid security condi-
tions, and internal disunity constantly threatened mis-
sion effectiveness and credibility in complex crises in the 
Darfur, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Syria.
This chapter looks at the comprehensive approach 
in the context of multidimensional peacekeeping opera-
tions. The topical sections are sequenced to provide an 
appreciation of multidimensional peacekeeping as a 
practical model for implementing the approach. From 
this point of departure, key tasks associated with peacekeeping will be examined 
with both the actors and organizational structures required to accomplish them. The 
chapter presents a model for deriving key multidimensional tasks from the mandate 
and associated lines of effort. This systematic approach links missions to accompa-
nying tasks and desired outputs and culminates with an evaluation that attributes 
benchmarks and quantifiable productivity to measure task completion. This exami-
nation demonstrates interdependency connected to coordinated lines of effort and 
validates the comprehensive approach. 
Despite the imperative to make use of a comprehensive approach to multidi-
mensional peacekeeping operations, the fundamental complexity and fragile secu-
rity conditions of the missions pose numerous challenges. Many UN operations are 
designed with the uniformed military and police forces running security missions in 
the same space as nongovernmental organizations and UN activities. It is common 
for such entities to coordinate with financial institutions, development agencies, 
and nongovernmental organizations that react to public and private interests. In 
addition to developing military capabilities, regional organizations such as the Euro-
pean Union have also been developing and are deploying civilian response capabili-
ties. The management or at least effective coexistence with mission actors presents 
unique and daunting challenges for leadership, mission coordination, and unity 
of purpose. Some of the more common challenges will be examined with possible 
options based on the unique characteristics of missions and actors that facilitate 
application of a comprehensive approach. Finally this imperative will be reprised 
and the best practices and lessons learned from peacekeeping operations will be 
reviewed to inform mission planning.
Vital Partnerships
The United Nations is the leading guarantor of peace. The complexity of 
modern conflicts and crises demands a flexible and responsive peacekeeping capa-
bility. Peacekeepers must be able to operate effectively among warring factions, 
criminal gangs, and citizens in need of security and humanitarian aid. Moreover, 
UN Multidimensional Approach
. . . a comprehensive, coherent, and integrated approach 
to the maintenance of international peace and security by 
preventing conflicts, preventing relapse, and building sustainable 
peace through effective preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, and peacebuilding strategies.
—Resolution 2086 (July 21, 2013)
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peacekeeping relies on political commitment as well as national 
contributions of reliable and sustainable support.
Peacekeeping operations must also be buttressed by proper, 
legitimate, and effective authorities to attract both local and inter-
national backing. In sum, peacekeeping missions cannot achieve 
their objectives without the prospect of reconciliation.
UN peacekeeping needs adequate and efficient means to 
gain competitive advantage. New force structures such as formed 
police units and military intervention brigades provide tacti-
cal advantages, more agility, and deterrent effect for peacekeep-
ing missions. Coupled with satellite mapping and collaborative 
information networks, the stakeholders can better understand actions that impact 
on success. But these specialized forces and capabilities are not available to many 
troop-contributing nations. Thus the United Nations must depend on partners more 
closely identified with warfighting than peacekeeping.
The same is true in those cases when for various reasons the United Nations 
depends on security partnerships rather than so-called blue helmet forces to fulfill a 
mandate of the Security Council. Whether adjunct security support involves African 
Union peacekeepers in Somalia or French-led troops in Mali, it provides essential 
peace enforcement capabilities in volatile regions. As the United Nations increas-
ingly turns to external forces, its mandates must clearly specify actions and restraints 
that will sustain legitimacy and direct transition to sovereign authority without 
unduly hampering mission effectiveness.
Modern Challenges
The term peacekeeping has traditionally been identified with lightly armed 
personnel who maintain separation between two sides in a conflict that agree to 
stop fighting. In the past, conflicts requiring peacekeeping operations were usually 
between two nations (interstate). By contrast, some recent conflicts have involved 
two or more factions in the same country (intrastate). Civilians are often targeted 
alongside the military, and the groups involved do not customarily observe the law 
of war. Given the sophistication and risks associated with peace operations, efforts 
such as peacemaking and rebuilding are required.
Peacekeeping creates time and breathing space for diplomatic efforts to 
address the underlying causes of conflict. It utilizes military power to create condi-
tions conducive to pursuit of a diplomatic solution. Traditional peacekeeping opera-
tions are defined by the following features:
• involved parties agree to external intervention
•  conflict between two or more nations contained within a defined bat-
tlespace
•  international laws of armed conflict accepted by the combatants
•  impartiality exercised on the part of peacekeeping force
•  minimum use of force.
Modern conflicts are a complex mix of internal and international influ-
ences. Their roots may be mainly internal, but they are complicated by cross-border 









host nations and external support 
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players who have an interest in the conflict. As a result, the structure of peacekeep-
ing missions has also changed.
Multidimensional Options
UN peacekeeping operations involve military, police, politics, civil affairs, 
rule of law, election monitoring, human rights, humanitarian affairs, reconstruction, 
public information et al., which are essential to multidimensional missions. How-
ever, traditional peacekeeping often delivers inadequate intervention. As a conse-
quence, peacemaking or peacebuilding—even peace enforcement—are better means 
of achieving and sustaining peace.
Peace enforcement refers to situations addressed under chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter, namely “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, 
and Acts of Aggression.” Accordingly, it is usually reserved for 
violent conflict and departs somewhat from traditional peace-






ous applications of military forces including maintaining, 
consolidating, and imposing peace as well as reconstruc-
tion, intervention, and humanitarian support.
Peacekeeping operations have taken on a new face over 
the past decade. The lack of donor funding, equipment, and 
professional and technically competent troop contributions has 
been a major limiting factor in many blue helmet operations. 
Because of the capability gap, many UN operations are delegated to either non-UN 
regional or multinational security forums such as the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
and African Union. This is particularly true of peace enforcement operations, which 
involve regional security imperatives and assertive military responses that may not 
be attainable or appropriate under direct UN auspices.
Command and Authorities
The UN Integrated Mission Planning Process (June 13, 2006) stated “an inte-
grated mission is one in which there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the 
strategic objectives of their common presence at the country level.” In recent crises 
traditional military command and control leadership has been challenged. Senior 
officers understand that operations are only one component of a larger campaign 
with a range of participants including host nation governments, external govern-
ment agencies, international and regional organizations, and nongovernmental and 
private sector actors. Since the military cannot impose leadership on these diverse 
but essential partners, leaders must internalize their need to include coordination 
and consensus, the essentiality of trust and information sharing, and the necessary 
constraints that bar full integration.
Peace Operations
•   peacemaking—employs diplomacy and negotiation 





•   peacekeeping—includes reintegrating former 
combatants into civilian society, improving security 
forces, strengthening the rule of law, improving 
respect for human rights, providing developmental 
assistance, and promoting peaceful mediation and 
reconciliation techniques
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Integrated missions provide means to operationalize the concept of a com-
prehensive approach. They are defined by common purpose and the mutual aware-
ness among various participants united under a mandate. Such missions are personi-
fied by a cooperative spirit and coordinated lines of activity. Their structures are 
influenced by operational conditions and intricate amalgams of political, humani-
tarian, security, and development imperatives. Likewise every mission requires 
unique capabilities tailored to meet the characteristics of the operational space. Inte-
grated missions usually distinguish between lines of command, coordination, and 
communication. What is more, leaders must adapt concepts of mission command 
to focus on the synchronization and harmonization of diverse participants who are 
entangled within the same complex and disordered operational space.
Initial attempts to enshrine integrated missions into fixed organizational 
structures and operational models proved to be difficult and counterproductive. As 
the multifaceted nature and inherent complexity of integration missions became 
evident, research shifted from standardized mission templates to a more agile visu-
alization that first analyzed the operational requirements, then designed a suitable 
mission structure. As the integrated mission concept moved to the field, immedi-
ate conflicts emerged that necessarily imposed barriers on the full integration of all 
mission actors. For example, the need to safeguard humanitarian impartiality and 
neutrality often superseded the perceived efficiencies and enhanced security that 
might be gained by openly cooperating with military peacekeepers. Full mission 
integration may be tempered and limited by the factors that enable the success of a 
peacekeeping mission, namely credibility, legitimacy, and national or local owner-
ship. Mission leaders must place the peacekeeping principles at the forefront and 
remember that coordinated efforts only enhance operational effectiveness when 
they are carefully orchestrated to uphold the legitimacy of the mission and its 
actors. The accompanying model (Figure 2.1) offers one graphical representation of 
how these disparate mission elements might be amalgamated in a cohesive organi-
zational structure.
The lines in the model organizational structure connecting various compo-
nents reflect a flexible organizational network rather than a command structure. 
Agents connect to the mission according to their functions, responsibilities, and 
contributions. This delicate balance demands strong and responsive leadership in 
each functional area. Humanitarian agents must determine how they might cooper-
ate with peacebuilding and peace consolidation components, especially in the midst 
of active conflict. Humanitarian space is also operational space, and mission lead-
ers must appreciate the nexus of the two in order to achieve operational coherence 
among other elements of the UN mission, as well as external actors.
Effort, Responsibilities, and Tasks
The transition from conflict to sustainable peace is both delicate and ardu-
ous. A range of simultaneous and mutually supporting activities must be harmo-
nized or deconflicted for peace and accountable governance to take hold. Multidi-
mensional peacekeeping missions require united and sustained political leadership 
as well as a mandate and donor backing to provide requisite authority, finances, 
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expertise, and resources. Peacekeeping operations are fraught with scant resources 
and difficult conditions that necessitate focus on the most essential tasks. The UN 
Capstone Doctrine identifies core strategic peacekeeping tasks to:
•   create a secure and stable environment and strengthen the ability of the 
state to provide security with full respect for the rule of law and human 
rights
•   facilitate political processes by promoting dialogue and supporting le-
gitimate and effective institutions of governance
•   provide a framework to ensure UN and other international actors pursue 
activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.
Operationalizing these tasks requires aligning several lines of activity in a 
comprehensive plan. Key peacekeeping functions are stipulated within a broader 
Figure 2.1 Model Organizational Structure for Integrated Missions
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campaign plan including added tasks that may require support, 
coordination, or at least mutual cognizance between uniformed 
peacekeepers and other lead agencies and organizations.
These tasks address crosscutting issues that have an 
impact on the implementation of the peacekeeping mandate 
and ultimately transition to legitimate and effective governance. 
Mission leaders need to be aware of how their actions and aims 
impact the range of tasks, and at the least not work at cross purposes. Further, mili-
tary leaders in particular must be cognizant of needs for political primacy and their 
command and coordination relationships with political leaders. They must adopt a 
consultative and unified approach to develop the trust and teamwork necessary to 
accomplish complex postconflict tasks.
Challenges and Considerations
It is now commonplace for a peacekeeping operation to share the same 
operational space with humanitarian nongovernmental organizations and UN spe-
cialized agencies, funds, and programs as well as international financial institutions, 
development agencies, and direct donor programs sponsored by external govern-
ments. Mission command and coordination mechanisms may not always be explicit, 
and even when coordination frameworks exist, they cannot be imposed and are hos-
tage to the goodwill and compliance of the contributing agencies and organizations.
The cohabitation of military operational space and humanitarian space is a 
perennial challenge in multidimensional peacekeeping. Peace enforcement missions 
especially may place tactical security requirements at odds with impartial humani-
tarian assistance. Recent operations have evidenced that providing military assis-
tance through quick impact projects or command-directed local development efforts 
can be important components of the toolkit of commanders. As a result, military 
units are increasingly involved in delivering relief aid while humanitarian organiza-
tions must rely on the military to ensure the safety and security of their staffs and 
operations and also enable access to target populations.
Many humanitarian actors view an inherent dilemma between the need for 






Figure 2.2 Core Tasks of Peacekeeping Operations
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to maintain neutrality and impartiality. Where military assistance tends to have a 
tactical aim that shapes security conditions, humanitarians tend to go where the 
need is most acute, regardless of factional affiliations or political sympathies. Groups 
or communities that militaries may classify as threats may be seen in turn by non-
governmental organizations as legitimate interlocutors for provision of humanitar-
ian access to communities in need within the regions they control. If humanitarians 
interact too closely or openly with the military, there is concern that legitimacy and 
impartiality may be compromised. Additionally, the militarization of foreign aid can 
result in unanticipated security consequences. Tactically expedient assistance may 
lead to the perception that affected populations are favored over others, inflaming 
tension and even causing serious breakdowns in security and stability. Discreet coor-
dination between uniformed peacekeepers and humanitarian agents can alleviate 
mission overlap, facilitate situational awareness, and preclude unintended conse-
quences of poorly coordinated military-led assistance efforts.
The Way Forward
Peacekeeping remains a work in progress, and the complexity of modern 
conflicts and crises demands a flexible and adaptive approach. Increased demand 
for peacekeeping continues to stretch peacekeeping capacity thin, and reliance on 
national and regional security consortiums to enable and then augment UN peace-
keeping is likely to increase. These missions demand sophisticated environmental 
Case Study: Directive from an Insurgent Leader
The following narrative is excerpted from a directive issued by an insurgent commander to his subordinates, which 
appeared in an article by Ramey L. Wilson entitled “Be Wise, Not Foolish: Medical NGO Deterrence Through an Insurgent Lens” in 
Small Wars Journal, July 17, 2013. [N.B. Consider the humanitarian and military implications of the directive.] 
“If you decide to let them operate in your area, you must insure that the people perceive  the NGO presence as evidence 
of our authority, not the corrupt government’s. More  importantly, you must make it very clear to the NGO that we determine 
their access to  the population. Without access to the people, the NGO will be unable to perform their work and will be perceived 
by their donors as ineffective and a failure.
“You must communicate to the NGO that their personal safety and access to the sick are dependent upon two things. 
First, the NGOs must give us credit for all of the care they are providing, not the corrupt government. Secondly, they must  
have no contact with the foreign invaders or intelligence agencies of the corrupt government. The NGO must know that  
if any information about you or your fighters is passed to our enemies, either by their workers or their patients, it will be  
on their heads.”
This excerpt highlights the complexity related to notions of impartiality and humanitarian space. From a humanitarian 
perspective, making concessions to insurgent leaders to gain access to populations in need might be acceptable trade-offs. 
From a military perspective, however, these concessions might empower groups that threaten security and jeopardize mission 
effectiveness. Moreover, it is not only so-called threat groups that might want to shape humanitarian assistance to achieve 
political and military goals. Humanitarians will be cautious about efforts that intend or are perceived to advance military 
objectives and cast doubt on humanitarian impartiality, whether requested by a mission or host nation, or by donors. Political, 
military, and humanitarian community leaders must understand the mission conditions to grasp how coordination might be 
effective and mutually supporting as well as how natural and proper limitations might impede unified action based on divergent 
organizational aims.
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awareness, professional discipline, and tactical 
restraint. Technical proficiency in high-end capabili-
ties such as engineering, medicine, logistics, and air, 
land, and sea transport are likewise required.
With a broader range of objectives, UN 
operations are increasingly multifunctional. Military 
leaders must consider how security tasks relate to 
humanitarian, developmental, and political objec-
tives. A broader range of objectives demands a new 
multidimensional approach that includes military, 
civilian, and police involvement. This diversity requires unity of effort and purpose 
if the mission is to achieve coherence. 
It is also clear that peacekeepers must be capable of accomplishing a variety of 
tasks. In addition to a traditional security role, they are expected to uphold law and 
order, monitor human rights, and promote responsible and sustainable governance.
. . .
The comprehensive approach is one organizing concept for harmonizing the 
various efforts of a diverse assortment of contributors to multidimensional peace-
keeping operations. Best practices for coordination and establishing unity of effort 
vary from one mission to another like the feasible level of cooperation among the 
participants. Leaders must understand their mission, the conditions, and operational 
contexts that introduce opportunities as well as the constraints that impact a coher-
ent approach to common aims and objectives. The approach is not a prescription 
or a procedure; rather, it is a conceptual framework designed to assist leaders in the 
analysis and execution of cooperative mechanisms to reinforce multifaceted cam-
paign aims, while appreciating that there will be deliberate and legitimate limits to 
full mission integration. As the lessons derived from multidimensional peacekeeping 
missions are internalized, the comprehensive approach concept should remain open 
to critical examination, evolution, and creative application.
Civil and Military Skill Sets
Although the military remain the backbone of most peacekeeping 
operations, the many faces of peacekeeping now include administrators 
and economists, police officers and legal experts, de-miners and 
electoral observers, human rights monitors and specialists in civil affairs 







by Jeffrey E. Kline and Lyla Englehorn
T he challenges of governance within the maritime domain exemplify the com-plex environment in which a comprehensive approach is essential. Even in the territorial waters of a single nation, maritime governance coordinates activities 
among many organizations that share information to establish awareness, agree on 
legal authorities, and deploy assets to patrol and counter threats in the commons. 
When disputes or conflicts occur on the open sea or within ungoverned territorial 
waters the situation can be aggravated by legal, historical, and cultural issues.
The incentives to overcome maritime challenges arise from international 
recognition of the common benefit of the oceans as highways of trade, mediums 
of communication, and sources of food and natural resources. The concept of a 
maritime common is established by the freedom of the seas doctrine that initially 
appeared in Mare Liberum by Hugo Grotius in 1609. His thesis on the right of the 
Dutch East India Company to exploit colonies in Southeast Asia 
drew on ancient free trade traditions and became the basis of 
international law that identifies the oceans as global commons. 
This settled admiralty law has been codified in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the International Conven-
tion on the Safety of Life at Sea.
The value of the oceans is measured in trade and resources. 
The United Nations has reported that 7.8 billion tons of interna-
tional cargo, or more than 80 percent of trade, is transported by sea. Additionally, 
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization indicates that fisheries and aquaculture 
provided 148 million tons of fish in 2010 with more than 80 percent consumed as 
food products. Additionally, 550,000 miles of undersea cables transmit the bulk of 
cyberspace communications. The oceans also provide energy resources for many 
nations through oil drilling, wind power, and wave motion. Moreover, they consti-
tute natural frontiers that connect 80 percent of the nations in the world and serve 
as conduits for humanitarian response and logistics.
Maritime Domain 
International treaties protect the oceans of the world as a common good. 
These agreements are enforced by a comprehensive approach that provides legal 
frameworks, resource allocation, commercial regulation, mitigation, and myriad 
Objective
To introduce stakeholders with varying interests in 
the oceans to issues, examine models of maritime 
governance, and consider comprehensive efforts 
by the United Nations and the European Union to 
combat piracy.
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provisions. They challenge states, organizations, and corporations to accede to 
standards of conduct, protect vital interests, and resolve conflicts, but they do not 
prevent competition. With the rival claims in economic exclusion zones (EEZs) 
from the Arctic to South China Sea, offshore resources, and fishing 
grounds, and threats posed by crime and terrorism, the maritime 
domain is not lacking in challenges.
The complexity of maritime issues can be illustrated by a 
fairly straightforward example of piracy. A large container ship may 
belong to owners in one nation, fly a different nation’s flag, and be 
manned by a multinational crew to transport its cargo to anywhere 
in the world. Once taken by pirates, the ship becomes of interest to 
the various nation-states whose citizens are involved in this process. Which of these 
nations should take the lead in representing or acting on behalf of the hostages and 
goods being ransomed? Although recent practice has recognized ship owners to be 
the primary negotiators with the pirates and to have the final say on use of force, 
the answer to this question still depends heavily on the circumstances.
Users and Abusers 
Nation-states are responsible for continental shelf and EEZ claims, and they 
introduce flagged naval and merchant vessels for political and commercial reasons. 
However, nations do not use oceans in identical ways. National maritime police, 
coast guards, customs and border patrols, naval forces, commerce and tourism agen-
cies, and fishery authorities can exercise overlapping jurisdictions and interests in 
offshore and international waters.
International organizations such as the United Nations International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of 
the International Chamber of Commerce provide frameworks and mechanisms 
for nation-states and business interests to act collectively to mitigate risks rang-
ing from weather to pirate attacks. These organizations are enabled and limited 
in their actions and resources by their members, but they do present a worldview 
and provide a communications umbrella for the maritime domain. For example, 
IMO and IMB collaboration efforts that institute best practices for safe navigation 
and countering piracy are disseminated throughout the commercial sector. Other 
organizations are focused on mitigating the threat such as the Contact Group on 
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which was created in 2009 by a UN Security Coun-
cil resolution.
Nonstate actors are divided into legitimate users and threats, with the latter 
group further broken into those who exploit the maritime domain for nefarious 
purposes and those who disrupt users. The actors include merchants, telecommuni-
cation conglomerates, deep-sea mining and drilling firms, fishermen, tourists, and 
scientists. Additionally, competing interests occur among the legal users. For exam-
ple, fishermen and tourists are concerned with the impact of offshore drilling and 
resorts. Moreover, misgivings arise in the telecommunication sector over dredging 
projects and fishing practices that may compromise undersea cables.
Nonstate threats include smuggling, poaching, polluting, and illegal immi-
gration, and both terrorism and piracy endanger state and nonstate users. Actors 
The Challenge of the Sea
The oceans of the world represent both a common 
good and a source of conflict. Overlapping 
political, military, economic, cultural, and other 
interests necessitate a comprehensive approach to 
ensure multidimensional response to crises.
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fall into different categories based on location, intentions, and profiles. One man’s 
fisherman might be another man’s poacher, and environmental activists are seen 
alternately as watchdogs or disruptive forces operating outside the law and threat-
ening legitimate maritime enterprises. For instance, Russia charged members of 
Green Peace with piracy for boarding an oil rig in the Arctic Ocean but then reduced 
the offense to hooliganism. Despite diverse intentions on the legitimate use of 
the oceans, a comprehensive approach representing a dependable range of users is 
needed to respond to crises.
Governance
Widely accepted principles establish and preserve maritime governance in 
territorial waters and on the high seas. For purposes of this discussion, governance 
is defined as the ability to mitigate risks related to use of the oceans or respond 
to emergencies through such activities as search and rescue. Moreover, it requires 
institutional integrity on the part of organizations engaged in maritime governance. 
For example, smuggling becomes hard to deter when customs agents are bribed to 
ignore shipments crossing borders. As a consequence integrity cannot be presumed 
in all situations and must be addressed in planning comprehensive approaches.
The first principle of maritime governance is gaining timely knowledge 
about areas in question. Known as maritime domain awareness, this knowledge is 
the product of information based on intelligence and sensors that is analyzed and 
shared in responding to emerging issues. The difficulties involved in 
establishing maritime domain awareness are a function of the area of 
the ocean concerned, resources needed to collect and analyze the infor-
mation, and the number of organizations requiring the information. For 
example, an observer scanning the horizon from shore with binoculars 
may spot potential poachers and alert someone to intercept them and 
check their license to fish. In contrast, the task of mitigating the risks 
of hurricanes to mariners requires weather forecasting that depends 
on worldwide sensors, multiple collection centers, complex prediction models, and 
global communications.
Platforms such as ships and aircraft are needed to provide hosts for sensors, 
visual patrols for deterrence, and the ability to intercept, board, and detain potential 
threats. The capability of platforms to search, cover, and intercept determine the 
enforcement capacity of governance. Returning to the counterpoaching example, 
one intercept boat capable of traveling at 25 knots is sufficient to cover a ten-mile 
radius from the shore tower. If attempting to effectively respond to piracy in the 
Indian Ocean, however, more platforms are required to collect information, monitor 
activity, provide a deterrent presence, and react as needed to counter pirates.
Finally, gathering information and responding necessitate a legal foundation 
to operate and prosecute offenders. In the case of counterpoaching, legal authority is 
delegated by the nation in whose waters the activities are conducted. The individu-
als both on shore and aboard the intercept boat might be fisheries officers enforcing 
the law. When extending the reach to the high seas and to the ungoverned territori-
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is challenging. UN resolutions, international and bilateral treaties, court settlements, 
and historical precedents offer models for legitimate maritime governance.
With a foundation of institutional integrity, the knowledge, platforms, and 
laws to establish maritime governance appear straightforward. However, executing 
the principles may be opposed at national and international levels by overlapping 
jurisdictions, rival claims, resource shortages, ungoverned waters, mistrust between 
nations and organizations, competing interests, and threats that exploit these seams. 
At a minimum, establishing governance in territorial waters requires the collabora-
tion of nations, organizations, and nonstate actors. These challenges are underlined 
by successful efforts to crush the piracy that flourishes off the Horn of Africa.
Combating Piracy
The traditional world of piracy involves ungoverned land space and insecure 
waters, proximity to shipping lanes, and resources (men, arms, and boats). Identify-
ing these conditions and the means required to address them comprises a compre-
hensive approach by the international community. The United Nations, Atlantic 
Alliance, and European Union have applied the principles of the comprehensive 
approach to countering piracy in the Horn of Africa. Pirate attacks and hijackings 
have decreased since 2010 in the Indian Ocean and around the world. The IMB 
cites preemptive naval actions against pirate mother ships, private security teams on 
board merchant vessels, and the applications of best practices in order to deter and 
defeat pirate attacks. 
The extent of cooperation that has been developed among navies from the 
shared objective of establishing maritime governance is unprecedented. More than 
two dozen nations have made contributions to naval deployments including Com-
bined Task Forces 151, Operations Atalana and Ocean Shield, and efforts by Chinese, 
Indian, and Russian forces. Even though deployments operate under national guid-
ance with varying rules of engagement, their common purpose led to Shared Aware-
ness and Deconfliction meetings for mutual awareness. Those meetings coordinate 
information exchange, address communication conduits, deconflict operations, and 
represent the military contributions, requirements, and recommendations to the 
more policy-oriented Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. With UN 
resolutions as the legal basis, many navies apply the principles of maritime gover-
nance in a comprehensive approach.
These efforts address the desire of the international community to counter 
the ungoverned seas element in a piracy environment. The operations reflect a com-
prehensive approach to deal with a complex maritime environment and differing 
national policies, but the challenges do not end there. The international community 
must address other facets of piracy including proximity to shipping lanes, ungov-
erned land, and a source of men, arms, and boats.
Although merchant transit rerouting has been used to avoid or minimize 
exposure to pirates from Somalia, the Indian Ocean remains a major highway for 
world trade. With transit planning and additional IMB best practices, however, ships 
can make themselves hard targets. These best practices include increasing transit 
speed through risky waters, weaving during pirate attacks, creating physical deter-
rents to boarding, increasing freeboard, and having post-boarding response plans. 
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In addition, private security companies aboard merchant ships in pirate waters have 
been successful in deterring attacks. The IMB Piracy Report Centre in Malaysia shares 
awareness worldwide on near real-time attacks to help vessels avoid danger. 
The activities of nongovernmental organizations are loosely coordinated 
with international and national efforts to introduce maritime governance in the 
shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean. For example, the International Recommended 
Transit Corridor in the Gulf of Aden was instituted by the Sub-Committee on Safety 
of Navigation of the UN International Maritime Organization to protect ships pass-
ing through high-risk areas. Merchants voluntarily report on convoy schedules, the 
entrance into and exit from the sea lanes, and incidents en route.
The Horn of Africa
In January 2013 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the 
EU Strategy for the Horn of Africa. It acknowledged traditional concerns attribut-
able to poverty, food scarcity, and lack of governance. On the danger to merchant 
shipping, a history of poor governance has encouraged pirates to seek havens and 
recruit impoverished locals to man their boats in Somalia. Earlier the Council of the 
Figure 3.1 Somali Piracy Threat (2005–2010)
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European Union provided a strategic framework for the Horn of Africa based on five 
lines of effort that included the following regional objectives:
• build democratic, sustainable, and accountable political structures
• work with local and international partners to resolve conflicts
• ensure security in the region does not threaten neighboring nations
• support measures to promote economic growth and reduce poverty 
• develop political and economic initiatives to foster cooperation.
In addition, it established the European Union Special Representative for 
the Horn of Africa to coordinate strategy, organizations, and partners in support of 
regional efforts.
The success in addressing foundational issues related to the Horn of Africa 
originates in the lessons of the European Union in developing a more holistic 
approach toward countering piracy. Those lessons highlighted several important 
areas that demonstrated a need to:
•  designate an overall coordinator to mount a comprehensive approach in 
the region
•  increase information sharing to combat the financial and logistical sup-
port of piracy
•  facilitate intelligence collection and relief efforts by nongovernmental 
organizations 
•  organize representation in international bodies to address the incarcera-
tion of pirates, collection of evidence, and management of interaction 
with private security companies
•  establish a desired endstate or a shared vision among member states.
These recommendations included economic components to develop port 
and fishery operations, livestock exports, and telecommunications; security com-
ponents to transform land governance; and judicial components to establish courts 
in Somaliland. These provide a template for efforts by the 
United Nations, European Union, and other organizations to 
establish effective governance in Somalia.
Prosecution of piracy-related financial transactions 
is also under international consideration. The UN Security 
Council passed Resolution 1950 in November 2010, which 
urges states to investigate transnational criminal networks that 
finance and receive funds from Somali piracy. In response, the 
Contact Group on Piracy off the coast of Somalia established 
an expert group on illicit financial flows to monitor money 
going into and out of piracy activities. Further UN working 
groups involving law enforcement organizations, private 
industry, and policy representatives have called for enhanced 
information sharing on financial transactions, increasing knowledge in channels of 
money laundering in the region, and better training to counter these activities. 
. . .
The calls for a comprehensive approach to the complex issues of piracy 
have resulted in a decrease in Somali pirate attacks, which points to the success of 
The Complexities of Piracy
New measures to enhance the effectiveness of counter-
piracy efforts and successfully prosecute alleged 
pirates will be crucial. The recommended solution is to 
implement, on an extremely urgent basis, a comprehensive 
multidimensional plan targeting Puntland and Somaliland 
and comprising three components—economic, security and 
jurisdictional/correctional—that would be brought to bear 
simultaneously.
—Report to the UN Security Council (2011)
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the response. In fact, a comprehensive approach is being recommended to address 
piracy in other areas of the world.
As governance and economic development languishes ashore in Somalia, 
piracy remains the easy business for many young Somali men, and the enterprise 
continues to expand and adapt. A report by the Center for Naval Analysis on ille-
gal or unregulated fishing off East Africa found that pirates were moving beyond 
ransoming hostages and were now selling licenses to international fishermen and 
offering protection for their boats for a fee. This example demonstrates how threats 
adapt to changing conditions and the subsequent need to regularly assess and adjust 
actions taken in a complex and fluid environment.
International responses to piracy illustrate the application of comprehen-
sive approaches to the maritime domain. Although acknowledged as a common 
good, continued freedom to access the oceans implies that legal, political, and other 
implications must be comprehended before an approach is made to mitigate threats 
to sea lanes, resources, and infrastructures. Understanding the principles of maritime 
governance and addressing the threats to the global commons are the first steps to 
ensuring that the oceans remain available to all mankind.
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Chapter 4.
Deterrence of Cyber 
Aggression
by Scott Jasper
A ll sectors of the economy rely on networks, systems, and services that form the integrated and interconnected domain known as cyberspace. Informa-tion and communication technologies are indispensable to national secu-
rity, particularly in both the defense and intelligence communities. Cyber protection 
is challenging because the domain is boundless, constantly changing, and open to 
all comers. In addition, cyber aggression is relentless, pervasive, and dangerous, and 
includes the theft or exploitation of data, disruption or denial of access or service, 
and destructive actions such as corruption, manipulation, and damage.
Cyberspace is probed and penetrated by hackers, criminals, terrorists, and 
foreign powers. As an interdependent network of information and communication 
technology infrastructures, it does not differentiate among commercial, civil, and 
military spheres. For example, industries own and operate 90 percent of 
the critical infrastructure in the Nation. Cyberspace integration is vulner-
able to cascading disruptions of infrastructure or key resource sectors.
The severity and complexity of cyber aggression compels coopera-
tion among stakeholders in the government, industry, and defense sectors 
to deter threat actors. The best way of attaining cooperation is examining 
and adapting extant models of the comprehensive approach as applied 
to mutual security concerns. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization declared in 
2010 that the adoption of the comprehensive approach by member nations relates 
not only to operations but also to Alliance activities involving threats such as cyber 
attacks. The approach to cyberspace could be applied to cooperative efforts that 
deter aggression.
Threat Actor Strategies
Cyber warfare can be defined in military terms as armed conflict conducted 
entirely or in part by cyber means. Contemporary acts of cyber aggression such 
as criminal exploitation, military or industrial espionage, nationalist hacker pro-
tests, and infrastructure infiltration or sabotage might represent lower level means 
of cyber warfare. The buying or renting of viruses (malicious code), exploits (code 
vulnerabilities), bot (compromised machine) networks, and command and con-
trol servers provide an array of tools for hostile actors and states. An attacker may 
launch a military confrontation during a period of tension by attacking civilian 
Objective
To secure cyberspace with its globally 
connected structure of servers, switches, 
and routers with the cooperation of 
individual stakeholders.
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infrastructure, synchronizing cyber attacks with surprise military strikes, or waiting 
until the war starts to activate previously implanted cyber disruptions. In addition to 
military operations that deny opposing forces the effective use of cyberspace systems 
and weapons, some national cyber campaign doctrine includes disruption of govern-
mental services, financial enterprises, and media outlets.
The distributed denial of services (DDoS) assaults (that flood systems with 
useless traffic) on Georgian infrastructure in 2008 heralded the reality that cyber 
aggression will be a component of any future conflict. Blogs and forums spread 
instructions and script to pro-Russian hackers to disrupt Georgian public and private 
sector Web sites. During the ground invasion, command and control servers man-
aged by a cybercrime group issued DDoS attack commands. Russian nationalists in 
the cyber riot in Estonia used similar means in 2007. Other nations might find com-
parable uses for nonmilitary actors and services against civilian targets. 
Chinese military doctrine calls for attacks on critical infrastructure in the 
enemy homeland in the event of war. In a conflict over Taiwan, computer network 
operations on the Mainland appear designed to target regional American logistics 
chains in host nations as well as logistics networks and companies in the continen-
tal United States. Failures of power grids, transportation networks, and banks could 
result in physical damage and economic disruption. 
The US military is dependent on this critical infrastruc-
ture at home and abroad. Chinese capabilities could 
impede military readiness and the operation of US 
critical infrastructure. 
Documented incidents of cyber aggression 
indicate that phase zero (or the start) of cyber warfare 
may have arrived. The Pentagon has made routine 
allegations against China in its annual reports to Con-
gress, citing network exploitation to gather intelligence 
on governmental activities, economic interests, and 
defense industries critical to US national security. One 
firm, for instance, was exposed as hacking information 
on drone technology originating in Shanghai.
The United States has performed acts of cyber 
aggression as demonstrated by the Stuxnet damage. 
President Barrack Obama ordered the attack against Iran under a program code-
named Olympic Games. This advanced persistent threat was discovered in June 2010 
after it infected nuclear plants by exploiting formerly unidentified zero-day (previ-
ously unknown and unpatched) Microsoft vulnerabilities. Stuxnet interferes with 
the frequency of converter drives that control the speed of the system, and it causes 
damage. It likely put 25 percent of the centrifuges at Natanz out of action in 2009. 
Cutting-edge Stuxnet malware is connected in some fashion to the data mining 
Flame, Gauss, and Duqu viruses.
The cyber activities of China and some other players differs from that of the 
United States because it provides state-owned enterprises with data to improve their 
competitive edge and also reduce the cost of gaining economic advantage. The state-
criminal nexus is evident as intruders use similar tools such as Remote Access Trojan, 
Advanced Persistent Threats
Intrusions that penetrate networks and systems to covertly steal 
information, manipulate data, and cause damage are commonly 
characterized as
•   targeted—approaching individuals with high-level access by 
spear-phishing with spoofed emails, workplace attachments, and 
social media
•   zero day—conducting reconnaissance to know target systems, 
applications, and networks to exploit unpatched or unknown 
computer vulnerabilities 
•   stealthy—installing malware, back doors, and connections 
to servers to steal information, alter critical infrastructure, or 
manipulate operations
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which include Poison Ivy, Ghost, and PlugX to capture and extract information. The 
impact of these intrusions on the United States amounts to billions of dollars in the 
loss of intellectual property and proprietary information. 
Competitive anti-access and area denial strategies evade direct attribution 
by condoning or outsourcing cyber power to proxy groups. The Cutting Sword of 
Justice activist group took responsibility for the Shamoon malware attack on the 
Saudi Aramco Oil Company in August 2012, but analysts suspect Tehran may have 
instigated it to gain influence after Riyadh pledged to increase oil production to 
compensate for sanctions against Iran. As Washington openly considered a military 
response to the use of chemical weapons by Damascus in 2013, the Syrian Electronic 
Army claimed responsibility for attacking the Web site of The New York Times, elicit-
ing warnings of a cyber war if the United States launched military strikes.
A Comprehensive Approach 
Cyber intrusions, disruptions, and attacks have escalated against defense sys-
tems, private industry, and critical public utilities. The US Army reported that more 
than 250,000 probes per hour target its systems and networks. An intrusion directed 
at a defense plant in 2011 filched more than 24,000 files, many related to sensitive 
technology. Hewlett Packard found in 2012 that the estimated cost of cybercrimes 
against 56 organizations averaged $8.9 million. The Department of Homeland 
Security emphasized that the cyber threat jeopardizes the security and availability of 
public services such as utilities, transport, health care, and banking. To highlight this 
point, the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team reported 124 
attacks in 2012 that targeted public services and nuclear industries.
Recent incidents reveal cyber aggression being employed in an increasingly 
systematic and coordinated fashion. Criminal exploitation, military or industrial 
espionage, hacker protests, and infrastructure infiltration or sabotage are ingeniously 
blended in competitor operations and campaigns. The threats range from advanced 
persistent threat intrusion to distributed denial of services, sometimes combined, as 
appeared to happen in the Dark Seoul DDoS attacks of 2013 on South Korean banks 
and media that served as a long-term subterfuge to steal military secrets. 
The protection of vulnerable but indispensable systems in cyberspace 
requires cooperation by private, governmental, and international partners to iden-
tify problems and find solutions. A comprehensive approach aligns parties based 
on shared interests, complementary opportunities, and mutual procedures. Given 
that the self-interest of organizations is facilitated by cooperative interaction, the 
approach seeks congruence of purpose, not unity of command. NATO recognizes 
implementation will require using civilian and military instruments that take into 
account the respective strengths and mandates of the participants. The compre-
hensive approach must be seen as more than a traditional whole-of-government 
approach because it integrates additional capabilities of allies and partners, non-
governmental and private voluntary agencies, international organizations, and the 
private sector to face international security challenges.
As described in British doctrine, a comprehensive approach is based on 
shared principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favor-
able and enduring outcomes in particular situations. While the NATO model offers 
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a starting point to design an approach for a given domain, the methodology must 
be modified for different operational environments, structural characteristics, and 
prominent partners including commercial actors. An approach to cyberspace secu-
rity could be described as employing unified principles and actions that integrate the 
capabilities of national governments, global industries, and international agencies to 
secure cyberspace. In its Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, the White 
House embodies this approach in suggesting public and private sector partnerships 
for cyber defense of critical infrastructure and key resources.
Complementary Deterrence 
The head of US Cyber Command, General Keith B. Alexander, USA, told a 
Senate committee in March 2013 that he had some confidence in the capability to 
deter major state-on-state attacks in cyberspace, but not in the low-level harassment 
of private and public sites, property, and data. The solution may reside in applying 
the comprehensive approach to achieve deterrence of cyber aggression. Deterrence 
seeks to shape perceptions of costs and benefits that dissuade threatening behavior. 
The strategic debate during the Cold War over deterring attacks was normally divided 
into deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. With the strategic interde-
pendence that resulted from globalization, one might add deterrence by entangle-
ment. Because of the unique characteristics and complexity of cyberspace, the best 
course of action is to employ a multifaceted deterrence strategy that combines pun-
ishment (retaliation), denial (prevention), and entanglement (rules for behavior). 
The policy of the Department of Defense for maintaining effective cyber-
space deterrence is partly founded on the ability to respond to hostile acts with pro-
portional and justified measures. This form of deterrence by retribution is compli-
cated by the difficulty of monitoring cyberspace, identifying intrusions, and locating 
the sources with a high degree of confidence in a timely way. For example, Advanced 
Persistent Threats mask the identities of attackers and sanction plausible deniability. 
If definitive attribution can be obtained, the military could act in self-defense within 
its prescribed authority to counter an equivalent armed attack in cyberspace. An 
alternative to the offensive use of malware is active defense. For industrial attacks it 
entails working with private sector partners to identify and interdict intruders, then 
deferring to appropriate government authorities for punitive actions. 
Deterrence by denial of benefit hedges against cyber aggression by increas-
ing adversary risks while reducing incentives. Increased security and resilience of 
networks and systems can discourage attacks. Defensive measures emphasize con-
tinuous protection of multiple threat points including network, endpoint, Web, and 
email security. Critical security controls provide technical means to monitor net-
works and systems, detect attempted attacks, identify compromised machines, and 
interrupt infiltration. These measures are designed to identify commercial tools that 
can detect, track, control, prevent, and correct weaknesses or misuse at threat points. 
Pursuit of deterrence by entanglement has the potential to reduce the risk 
of miscalculation and conflict. Cyberspace governance is extremely difficult because 
of requirements to prosecute nefarious acts across multiple lines of jurisdiction. The 
gap between capabilities and enforceable guidelines is complicated by the speed 
at which the domain changes and by its global nature, which transcends issues of 
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sovereignty. Collaborative means such as international norms promote order in 
cyberspace by encouraging states to meet their responsibilities to prevent crime and 
enact appropriate and effective self-defense measures. Likewise, regional or bilateral 
dialogue builds trust and provides opportunities to share threat indicators, commu-
nicate incidents, and manage crises collectively.
A comprehensive approach can achieve complementary strategies for deter-
rence of cyber aggression. The following questions are pertinent when considering 










For offensive cyber operations in self-defense, a response whose scope, dura-
tion, and intensity will likely cause significant kinetic damage demands complete 
certainty of attribution. Intrusion traffic and exfiltration of information often routes 
through compromised servers in a third country, complicating proof of origin. Find-
ing servers in nations or malware that contain national language characters does not 
necessarily provide sufficient evidence to confirm that any government endorsed 
or commissioned a given event. For example, China may have been responsible for 
attacks on South Korean banks and television networks in March 2013 based on Chi-
nese words and other clues in the malware. However, such indicators are commonly 
used by cyber attack designers for disinformation and were even found in Stuxnet. 
The lack of timely attribution complicates decisions on offensive operations, driv-
ing requirements for cyber intelligence that go beyond issues of vulnerability and 
software identification. 
Although some argue that fundamental interconnectedness of networks 
means the effects of offensive cyber operations cannot be limited, others claim that 
contained operations are possible even in broadly connected systems. Neverthe-
less, deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental escalation could trigger a chain reaction 
that unintentionally intensifies conflicts. Only the President of the United States 
can approve a cyber operation capable of significant consequences, a hard decision 
because of the inability to predict collateral damage and political implications. 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty guarantees individual or collective 
self-defense in the event of an armed attack on any of its signatories. When applied 
to cyber threats, the Tallinn Manual (rule 13) stipulates that the scale and effects 
determine whether a cyber operation qualifies as an armed attack. Although Stux-
net caused physical damage, the International Group of Experts that developed the 
Tallinn Manual was divided on whether the damage constituted an armed attack. 
The NATO Policy on Cyber Defense reiterates that any collective defense response is 
subject to political decisions by the North Atlantic Council. This ambiguity might 
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give an adversary good reason to use cyber as a method of attack against critical 
infrastructure.
The imposition of costs in deterrence by punishment can reduce the will-
ingness or ability of an adversary to go on the offensive. The controversial concept 
of active defense entails returning fire at hackers to prevent further disruption. In 
active defense, networks and systems are monitored to intercept malicious traffic. 
Once the malware is detected, actions can be taken including diversion to a hold-
ing area or other actions aimed at the attacker. The issue is whether to regulate or 
standardize the actions. A public-private partnership could provide the uniformity 
of government coordinated responses and the advantage of private sector access to 
top technologies and experts. But legal constraints must be adapted to permit more 
aggressive defensive tactics.
Deterrence by Denial
Information technology security practitioners acknowledge increasing 
network vulnerabilities with particular concern over advanced persistent threats 
and mobile platforms such as smart phones and iPads. The unpredictable effect of 
active defense on third parties makes passive defense for denial of benefit a prefer-
able option. A defense-in-depth strategy can theoretically protect the computers, 
networks, and control systems in critical infrastructure and key resource sectors 
from cyber aggression. Layering multiple security technologies combined with best 
practice endpoint management can decrease the risk of malware penetration because 
each layer can block a different aspect of multipronged cyber attacks. Given that the 
greatest barrier to achieving endpoint security is insufficient resources, the govern-
ment should consider providing market incentives for private sector investments in 
cybersecurity.
In February 2013, after Congress failed to enact legislation, President Bar-
rack Obama signed an executive order entitled “Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity.” It sought to establish a partnership with private sector owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure to both improve information sharing and imple-
ment risk-based standards. The order also expanded the role of the Department of 
Three Case Studies
Digital Espionage—Flame Virus (2012): Copied keyboard entries, sifted email and text messaging, captured screen 
shots, and recorded microphone sounds. It infected computers by scanning for and querying Bluetooth devices to create social 
profiles. It took up to 20 megabytes with command and control network of 50 to 80 registered domains for built-in and 
downloadable modules.
Distributed Denial of Services—Estonia (2007): Assault from botnet identified with both cybercriminals in  
St. Petersburg and the Russian Business Network spread to 85,000 computers. It became first reported act of cyber aggression 
against a NATO member. Conditions under which attacks may trigger collective defense under article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty remain vague.
Destructive Attack—Stuxnet Worm (2010): Targeted Iranian nuclear plants by exploiting unidentified zero-day 
Microsoft vulnerabilities. It inhibited frequency converter drives to control speed and damage the system. Ultimately it was 
discovered in 170 power plants including some in North America. It could be considered an armed attack because it damaged or 
destroyed equipment.
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Homeland Security in providing classified cyber threat and technical information 
to both public and private sector custodians of critical infrastructure. Moreover, the 
executive order tasked the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology to develop a cybersecurity framework that incorporates consensus standards 
and best practices. The framework will provide a prioritized, repeatable, and perfor-
mance-based approach to assessing and managing cyber risks. 
An offense-informs-defense model that uses knowledge of actual attacks 
that compromise systems can shape the development of technical measures. The 
Council on CyberSecurity leads development of critical security controls to provide 
a prioritized, risk-based approach to security based on an understanding of current 
attacks. The controls encompass best practices that include vulnerability assessment, 
malware and boundary defenses, access control, account monitoring, and data loss 
prevention. The inaugural cybersecurity framework is assembled around the core 
functions of identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. Critical security controls 
are part of informative references that illustrate methods to carry out the activities 
under the functions. The White House drafted an initial set of incentives for private 
industry to adopt these best practices, including cybersecurity insurance, liability 
limitation, and rate recovery.
Deterrence by Entanglement
The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, the first such international treaty, 
outlined the widest possible means of cooperation to investigate crimes involv-
ing computer systems and data and to gather evidence electronically on criminal 
RECOVER  Restore capabilities or services impaired by a cybersecurity 
event recovery planning, systems restoration, communications and 
assurance, improvements and lessons learned
RESPOND  Take action to counter or contain a cybersecurity event 
response planning, coordination, analysis, mitigation, improvements
DETECT  Rapidly identify when a cybersecurity event occurs anomaly 
and event identication, continuous security monitoring, detection 
processes
PROTECT  Implement safeguards to ensure essential services access 
control, awareness and training, data security, information protection 
processes and procedures, maintenance
IDENTIFY  Develop understanding to manage cybersecurity risk 
asset management, business environmental awareness, governance, 
risk assessment and management
Figure 4.1 Functions of a Comprehensive CyberSecurity Framework
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offences. Deterrence is explicitly cited to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of these systems. This agreement also provided for deterring cross-border 
crimes while recognizing issues of national sovereignty. To date, only 35 nations 
including the United States have acceded to the treaty though others are in the pro-
cess of ratifying it. Some believe nations should be held accountable for malicious 
actions or transiting information systems within their borders by introducing norms 
of responsible behavior. 
By respecting behavioral norms, US strategy can assure predictability that 
helps to prevent misunderstandings that may lead to conflict. China and Russia have 
urged the United Nations to adopt their International Code of Conduct for Informa-
tion Security to enable greater control over content. Despite the limited interest in 
additional international agreements, plenary speakers at the Budapest Conference on 
Cyberspace stressed the need for norms. A follow-on conference resulted in the Seoul 
Framework for and Commitment to Open and Secure Cyberspace, which provided 
new guidelines for coping with threats from cybercrime and cyber war.
Confidence building can prevent conflicts through measures that establish 
transparency, cooperation, and stability. The Organization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe seeks to reduce misperception, escalation, and conflict resulting from 
information and communication technologies. The United States and Russia have 
formed a working group to assess emerging threats and move toward introducing 
confidence-building measures to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding cyber 
incidents that could develop into bilateral crises. 
. . .
Cyber warfare has been described as a conflict between nations where attacks 
originating in the digital domain are directed against military and industrial targets 
for political, economic, or territorial gain. The term cybered-conflict might be bet-
ter suited than cyber war in indicating the complexity and ambiguity of hostilities 
waged in cyberspace that include asymmetric conflicts, hybrid warfare, and coun-
terterrorism. General Martin Dempsey, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
recently warned that “disruptive and destructive cyber attacks are becoming a part 
of conflict,” and that “civilian infrastructure and business are targeted first.” Former 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta affirmed that “an aggressor nation or extrem-
ist group could . . . contaminate the water supply in major cities or shut down the 
power grid across large parts of the country.” Still, the majority of reported cyber 
attacks have not been violent, purposeful, and political, and are thus more accurate-
ly described as hostile or disruptive cyber activities.
Cyber activities are merely acts of aggression—at most a lower level com-
ponent of cybered-conflict. General Dempsey claims national mission teams could 
defend against these hostile activities but recognizes the need to collaborate with 
other nations to establish norms of behavior in cyberspace and improve information 
sharing and standards. However, it is difficult to establish consensus regarding the 
legitimate and effective employment of deterrence strategies that encompass offen-
sive concepts (punishment), defensive measures (denial), and collaborative mecha-
nisms (entanglement). 
Within the United States, the Office of Cyber Policy in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense attests to the need for the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the 
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Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense to coordinate 
with public, private, and international partners in cybersecurity efforts. Although 
some workshops have been based on a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity 
and others on cyber deterrence, there is little empirical work on intersecting issues 
like attribution, legality, liability, privacy, verification. The questions raised in this 
chapter offer a point of departure for analyzing the viability of offensive concepts, 
defensive measures, and cooperative mechanisms. Further research is necessary to 
determine exactly how a comprehensive approach can achieve complementary strat-
egies for deterrence of cyber aggression.
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Chapter 5.
Challenges to Energy Security
by Daniel A. Nussbaum
A ll sectors of a modern society and economy depend on energy. Thus any disruption to energy has serious consequences across a wide range of systems, organizations, and communities. The security of energy neces-
sitates ensuring that supplies meet the demands imposed by consumers. Moreover, 
energy security is fundamental to national defense including military operations. 
Yet achieving security is difficult because of both its complexity and extent. Diverse 
situations such as burning Iraqi oil fields after the Gulf War, natural disasters such as 
the Fukushima earthquake and Hurricane Katrina, and attacks on power substations 
have widespread ramifications. These challenges to energy security 
impact how various communities collectively plan and implement 
safeguards and resolutions.
Because of the rapidly expanding consumption of energy 
around the world, opportunities to threaten energy security are 
increasing, and will continue to magnify in the future. Data com-
piled by the International Energy Office for 2013 and the estimat-
ed demands for energy over the next two decades validate claims that the growth 
in consumption will be great, and will be accompanied by a subsequent increase in 
energy security vulnerabilities.
Some Definitions
A recent study defines energy security as reliable access to sufficient, affordable 
energy supplies to fuel economic growth. Alternatively, the “4-As” model represents 
energy security in terms of availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptabil-
ity. On examination, the concept of affordability, though intuitively meaningful, 
is complex and difficult to fully 
understand and explain. Recog-
nizing this, the Military Opera-
tions Research Society organized 
a workshop for experts and 
analysts to research challenges to 
affordability, using affordability 
analyses to improve decisionmak-
ing, and criteria for the provi-
sion of consistent and useful 
affordability analyses. It also 
Objective
Define energy security, identify potential 
disturbances, and determine measures to secure 
energy supplies through a comprehensive approach.
4As: Available, Accessible, Affordable, Acceptable
•   availability—involves the physical occurrence of energy that may 
make it either easy or hard to retrieve 
•   accessibility—addresses the geopolitical environment with special 
regard to energy that can be retrieved and made usable
•   affordability—speaks to the financial implications of energy 
security with respect to consuming energy according one’s means
•   acceptability—concerns the environment in the sense that the 
footprint of energy retrieval does not violate policy-based norms
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offered background on affordability analyses and created a framework for develop-
ing a practical manual for affordability analysts to review strategic goals, determine 
desired outcomes, and identify the capabilities and resources required to achieve 
affordable and acceptable levels of energy security. By comparison, Gawdat Bahgat of 
the National Defense University has proposed a more simplified definition of afford-
ability: “The uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price with 
little environmental footprint.”
Threats to Energy Security
An important issue to address is planning for threats to energy security. 
Risks arise from many sources including natural disasters, acts of sabotage, national 
traumas, contested international space (from challenges to Kuwaiti sovereignty to 
navigational rights through the increasingly accessible Northwest passage), peace-
keeping, peacemaking, high levels of volatility in energy commodity prices, and 
flash transnational currency flows. Another critical but often overlooked threat to 
energy security is aging or sabotage of infrastructure. Infrastructure refers to proce-
dures and hardware occupying a position between generating energy (such as oil 
wells, power plants, and photovoltaic solar arrays) and consuming energy (govern-
ment, commercial, and consumer end-use). Therefore infrastructure occupies the 
position between supply and demand within the energy enterprise. The aging or 
sabotage of infrastructure deserves attention not only because of its criticality to the 
enterprise, but because it is a known and noticeably weak link. Infrastructure vul-
nerabilities have consequences for energy security and, importantly, secondary and 
tertiary consequences with less apparent implications. A high-level systems engi-
neering understanding of infrastructure encompasses the operation and linkages of 
three major components:
•   generation—oil, gas, coal, nuclear, hydro, solar, wind, and geothermal 
power plants
•   transmission—independent system operators that coordinate, control, 
and monitor the electrical power system within a given nation or region 
•   consumption—use by commercial, consumer, public, and defense sectors 
as well as generation and transmission segments of the energy enterprise.
Two grid outages merit mentioning. The Northeast blackout in 2003 was a 
widespread power outage that occurred throughout parts of the Northeastern and 
Midwestern United States and Ontario. It was the second most widespread black-
out in history, affecting an estimated 10 million people in Ontario and 45 million 
people in eight US states. The primary cause was a software bug in the alarm system 
at the FirstEnergy Corporation in Ohio. Operators were unaware of the need to redis-
tribute power after overloaded transmission lines hit unpruned foliage. What would 
have been a manageable local blackout cascaded into widespread distress on the 
electric grid.
The other outage took place as the result of a sniper attack on transformers 
and infrastructure at the Medford substation of Pacific Gas and Electric in San Jose, 
California, in 2013. This recent incident underlines concerns over the vulnerability 
of the electric grid to sabotage and demonstrates the importance of understanding 
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the context of an attack including determining 
whether it is a precursor to broader attacks.
Susceptibility to Breaches
While all sectors of society and the economy 
rely on energy, it is necessary for the purpose of 
analysis to have a rough taxonomy of generalized 
sectors with interests in maintaining energy secu-
rity, each with its own subcategories. For the pur-
pose of understanding the comprehensive approach 
to energy security, the following agglomerations 
are proposed: civilian and military components of 
government, commercial entities, and private sector 
organizations. Each of these is required to address 
issues associated with energy security at one time or 
another.
The modern world is dynamic and inter-
connected. Depending on external circumstances, 
some or all elements of the society will be affected 
by active threats or risks to energy security require-
ments. Moreover, the situation has the potential to 
escalate rapidly from no participants, to some par-
ticipants, to many participants, to all participants 
simultaneously.






















International Energy Outlook 2013,
Figure 5.2 Worldwide Energy Consumption
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Critical infrastructure protection exemplifies an arena that displays a ten-
dency for risks to escalate and spread. The term critical infrastructure describes those 
assets that are essential for society and the economy to function. According to the 
Center for Infrastructure Defense at the Naval Postgraduate School, critical infra-
structures are composed of systems of components that combine to achieve desired 
functions or that fail when the functions are disrupted.
As critical infrastructure protection is situated at the nexus of cyber and 
energy structures the well-known public policy debate over protecting against cyber 
attacks clearly spills over to energy infrastructures. Cyber attacks interfere with elec-
trical systems, pumps transporting liquid fuel, and the machinery relying on liquid 
fuel. Thus commercial, government, and private sector consumers who are impacted 
care a great deal about this situation. The same cyber attacks can undermine the 
ability of the US Navy to provide timely refueling of combat logistics fleet ships that 
replenish warships at sea, impacting on military operations. Accordingly, military 
forces also affect the situation. Finally, it is easy to imagine that first responders in 
the civilian sphere will be hindered in performing their missions by degraded com-
munications systems, all of which are energy dependent. It becomes obvious that a 
small-scale attack can readily escalate to involve even more stakeholders who find 
their equities seriously compromised.
Energy consuming nations are subject to the fragility of stability because 
policymakers and analysts must consider worst-case scenarios and develop risk 
mitigation strategies to defend against potential breakdowns. The accompanying 
table indicates the complexity and interactions among threats to energy security and 
the categories directly affected by these threats. An “x” in a cell indicates a threat to 
the sector in the first row by a threat in the first column. The table has been filled in 
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conservatively. That means that a nexus is not identified unless it is clear and unas-
sailable. Thus if the table was completed less conservatively, it would be filled out 
more densely and indicate greater complexity in subsequent interactions.
The complexity of energy security requires using the comprehensive 
approach. Preplanned exercises offer fruitful ways to analyze energy security consid-
erations. On the civilian side, these might look like the sort of exercises conducted 
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the United States, or on 
the military side, the regular exercise programs sponsored by NATO, especially train-
ing including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
. . .
Although definitions of energy security can rapidly become complex and 
abstruse, the core of the definition provided by Gawdat Bahgat is the “uninter-
rupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price with little environmental 
footprint.”
Depending on external circumstances, the challenges to the availability 
of energy supplies have the potential to escalate from affecting selected consum-
ers to impacting global markets. A military approach to such circumstances might 
consider a continuum of military operations that has six stages: shaping the environ-
ment, deterring the threat, seizing the initiative, dominating the enemy, stabilizing 
the environment, and enabling civil authorities. In addition, preplanned exercises 
that incorporate energy security considerations are also useful tools. They may 
include FEMA-type exercises on the civilian side and NATO exercise programs on the 
military side. It is noteworthy that the latter regularly incorporate aspects of both 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.
Given the complexities of the interaction among multiple parties, the 
requirement exists to accommodate such relationships and diverse or even contra-
dictory interests lest the complexity of energy security leads to a reaction against 
cooperation. Finally, the realm of energy security presents unanswered questions 
based on the inherent complexity of the subject. There is no way to address this 
complexity other than as part of a comprehensive approach.
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Appendix: Sources of Guidance
Extensive guidance exists on developing comprehensive approaches to operations and 
applying them to specific challenges. The following list of selected US and international 
publications is related to the field of civil-military operations as discussed in chapter 2 on 
multidimensional peacekeeping.
NATO Standardization Agency, Allied Joint Publication 3.4.9, Allied Doctrine for Civil-Military 
Cooperation (February 2013).
UK Ministry of Defense, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, 
“The Comprehensive Approach” (January 2006). 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Guidelines on the Use of Military and 
Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief (“Oslo Guidelines”) (November 2007)
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Civil-Military Guidelines and 
Reference for Complex Emergencies” (March 1, 2008).
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles 
and Guidelines (March 2008).
US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07, Peace Operations (August 1, 2012).
———— Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations  
(June 24, 2011).
———— Joint Publication 3-29, Humanitarian Assistance (January 23, 2014).
US Institute of Peace, “Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-
Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile 
Environments” (July 24, 2007).
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List of Acronyms
CAO comprehensive approach to operations
CBM confidence-building measure
CIMIC civil-military cooperation
CIP critical infrastructure protection
CMCO civil-military coordination
DDoS distributed denial of services
EEZ economic exclusion zone
EU European Union
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
IMB International Maritime Bureau
IMO International Maritime Organization
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO nongovernmental organization
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